This paper extends our recent game-theoretic approach 111 to design and embed watermarks in Gaussian signals in the presence of an adversary. The detector solves a binary hypothesis testing problem. The system is designed to minimize probability of error under the worst-case attack in a prescribed class of attacks. In this paper, the embedder is allowed to filter the host signal and add a watermark, thereby making the scheme nonadditive. The theory is applied to wavelet-based image watermarking. We find that. in this framework, additive watermarks are clearly suboptimal.
INTRODUCTION
Applications of watermarking include copyright protection, document authentication, covert communications, and data embedding. In these applications, a watermark is embedded within a host data set such as text. audio, image, or video. This embedding should be nearly imperceptible and robust against possible manipulations of the watermarked data, in the sense that it should be possible to reliably extract the watermark in a degraded version of the signal. Degradations include operations such as addition of noise, filtering, compression, format conversion, and desynchronization. These degradations could be intentional (due to an adversary) or nonintentional (e.g.. due to a lossy communication channel).
We extend recent work Ill on the detection-theoretic aspects of the Gaussian watermarking problem in two ways: first, we enlarge the set of strategies for the watermarker to include signal scaling and filtering, and demonstrate substantial advantages of such strategies: second, we apply the optimal embedding and attack strategies (which are the solution to a maxmin optimization problem) lo wavelet-based image watermarking. 
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
denote the original N I x Nz digital image to be marked, taking values in R and modeled as a Gaussian random vector N(0, R,) whose components are indexed by n E R. A watermark is inserted in s. resulting in a marked image x. that is made publicly available. The watermark is available at the detector. but s itself is not (blind watermarking). We assume that an adversary (attacker) takes z and produces a degraded image y. The decoder has access to y and k but not to s (blind watermarking). and must determine whether the watermark was embedded in x or not.
Assume that the watermarker implements the linear operation:
is a Gaussian random vector (thought of as a pattern) independent of s. We call w = x -s = (a -1 ) s + Qp the watermark; w depends on s unless @ is the identity matrix, I. In this case, the watermark is said to he additive. The vector p is available at the detector and is independent of s by construction. The embedding is subject to a constraint on the average squared-error distortion:
Assume the attacker implements the attack
is a Gaussian random vector independent of x. The attack is nonadditive, unless r = I. The attack is also subject to a constraint on the average squarer-error distortion:
GAME-THEORETIC FORMULATION OF THE WATERMARKING PROBLEM
It is assumed that the watermark detector knows or is able to learn the statistics of the attack (r and Re); the detector then implements the optimal likelihood ratio test (Lm [2] .
The detector decides between the two hypotheses:
where 4 = Cou[Y] = rQR,QrT + R e is the covariance matrix for the data Y conditioned on P which is available at the detector.
Probability of Error
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process and the attack. The watermarker wants to minimize P. and the attacker wants to maximize it. The problem is thus naturally formulated as a game between the information hider and the attacker. The detection game is a minmax oroblem:
technical assumptions. Hence we use the averaged distance 2' as our design criterion, and seek which is equivalent to (6)
Solution of Maxmin Problem (6)
The solution to the minmax problem has been derived analytically [3] followinga proceduresimilar to Ill. The derivation is not included here due to space constraints. The solution possesses some remarkable properties. where the optimization is subject to the distortion constraints (2) and (4).
Assume equallylikely hypotheses. For the test (5) . P, =
Q(d/Z). where Q ( t ) a (2~)-'/~$;
du is the tail probability of the normal distribution N(0, l ) , and [Z]
is twice the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the two Gaussian distributions in (5). The average probability of error is given by 
WAVELET IMAGE WATERMARKING
In this section. we use a local Gaussian model for image wavelet coefficients to compute estimates of the probability of error and the optimal distributions for the watermarker and attacker. The wavelet transform is viewed as an approximate KLT. In all experiments. we used Daubechies' 917 wavelets and 4 decomposition levels (10 subbands). In order to facilitate comparisons, all images are normalized in such a way that the per-pixel energy oftheir wavelet coefficients (not including coarse-band coefficients -see below) is unity The normalization factor for the energies is 0.0056 for Barbara, 0.0076 for Baboon, 0.0029 for Goldhill, and 0.0025 for Lena. Let ~(~) ,~( i j ,~( i ) ,~( i ) ,~ E R respectively denote the wavelet coefficients of the host image, the watermark pattern. the watermarked image, and the output of the attack. 
EQModel
We model the wavelet coefficients as independent Gaussian random variables having zero mean and unequal variances. The variance field in each subband is assumed to be slowly changing. The encoder, attacker and decoder are assumed to know or be able to estimate this variance field. The watermark is embedded only in the detail subbands. Information is not embedded in approximation coefficients, for which a local Gaussian model would be less accurate.
Distortion Levels
We need to find realistic values for the distortion levels D , and D,. We find it convenient to specify D , and the distortion ratio Due to the existence of threshold effects in the human visual system. the addition of a visual pattern to an image is not noticeable when the pattern intensity is low enough.
The just noticeable UN) pattern intensity level depends both on the image and on the pattern. We make the standard assumption that the visibility of a random pattern depends primarily on its second-order statistics 181. When considering a particular application. the watermarker would often assume a target D, for the attacker and select D, so that the watermarks are slightly below a JN level DG(D.). We have experimentally determined the curves D: (D,) and D;(D,) for Lena, see Table 1 Subjective evaluation of watermarks and attacks can be supplemented with objective distortion measures such as SNRs. However, the standard SNR may be a deceptive measure because it could be high while the distortion in the critical region a, is high. For this reason we also consider an SNR restricted to R,:
where p is the average of s(n) over the region R,. Clearly, SNR,(R,) 5 SNR,(R). Likewise, after attack, we have an area R, of pixels that have been modified by the watermarking process and/or the attack. Typically R, is larger than 0,. We define where p is the average of s(n) over the region n.. Table 2 shows PAP, PAC and SNR values for watermarking of four test images, using JN watermarks. Table 3 shows P . for the optimal nonadditive scheme as well as for the optimal additive scheme [l]. It is seen that relaxing the I11 -475 additivity constraint reduces Pe by several orders of magnitude.
Remark. The watermarker finds it generally useful to scale down the host signal components to increase the efficiency of the detector while the attacker has an interest in scaling down the watermarked signal components. Lena as a function of distortion ratio y.
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